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SOME SOBER CONCEPTIONS OF MATHEMATICAL 
TRUTH 
Marco Panza  
REHSEIS, CNRS and University of Paris 7. 
Abstract. It is not sufficient to supply an instance of Tarski’s schema, “p” is true if and only if p for a 
certain statement in order to get a definition of truth for this statement and thus fix a truth-condition for it. 
A definition of the truth of a statement x of a language L is a bi-conditional whose two members are two 
statements of a meta-language L’. Tarski’s schema simply suggests that a definition of truth for a certain 
segment x of a language L consists in a statement of the form: ν (x) is true if and only if τ (x), where 
ν (x) is the name of x in L’ and τ (x) is a function τ : S → S’ (S and S’ being the sets of the statements 
respectively of L end L’) which associates to x the statement of L’ expressed by the same sentence as that 
which expresses x in L. In order to get a definition of truth for x and thus fix a truth-condition for it, one 
has thus to specify the function τ. A conception of truth for a certain class X of mathematical statements is 
a general condition imposed on the truth-conditions for the statements of this class. It is advanced when 
the nature of the function τ is specified for the statements belonging to X. It is sober when there is no need 
to appeal to a controversial ontology in order to describe the conditions under which the statement τ (x) is 
assertible. Four sober conceptions of truth are presented and discussed. 
Key words: mathematical truth, conception of truth, truth-condition, statements vs. sentences, Tarski’s 
condition. 
Truth is generally considered to be a crucial matter in the philosophy of 
mathematics. It is quite common to define realism in mathematics as the thesis that 
mathematical statements can be true, but their (eventual) truth does not depend on 
the fact that they are proved, or even that they could be proved in our mathematical 
theories, being rather somehow independent of us. In other words, it is generally 
accepted that to be realist in mathematics means to consent to the thesis that truth or 
falsehood are intrinsic properties of mathematical statements.  
I do not intend to discuss this thesis here. My aim is much more modest. I simply 
observe that, commonly, this definition assumes implicitly not only that there are 
mathematical statements, but also that they are homogeneous with respect to the 
property of them that makes them eventually true or false. This means that 
mathematical statements, whether true or false, are all so in the same sense or for the 
same sort of reasons. If one does not take this for granted but nevertheless accepts 
the previous definition, one can hardly admit that realism in mathematics is a well-
defined and even a consistent thesis, and thus argue in favour of or against it. One 
evidence for this is that people who consider themselves to be realist in mathematics 
in the previous sense mainly look for a suitable conception of mathematical truth, 
and only for one.  
When mathematics is considered abstractly as a (more or less well-defined) 
domain of justified beliefs, or even as a system of statements of a certain sort that 
belong to such a domain because of their form, their content, or the modality of their 
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justification, such an assumption is quite tenable. Explicitly or not, it can even enter 
the definition of mathematics itself and, when the realist thesis (as previously 
defined) is accepted, also contribute to the definition of mathematical knowledge. In 
contrast, it seems to me that when mathematics is considered as an actual practice or 
activity acccompanying the history of humanity, or even as the system of issues 
resulting from such a practice or activity, this same assumption is quite doubtful. 
There is no doubt, I think, that from such a point of view, one may rightly speak 
about mathematical statements, that is, admit that the term “mathematical statement” 
refers to genuine objects. And I also hold that one can sensibly assign to these latter 
objects the property of being true. But, when mathematics is conceived in such a 
way, there is no guarantee that these objects are homogeneous with respect to what 
makes they are true or false; there is no guarantee that, if true, they are all so in the 
same sense or for the same sort of reasons.  
There are at least two ways to argue that this is not really the case. The first one 
consists in seeking out various occurrences of the term “true” and their cognates in 
texts unanimously considered as mathematical ones, and to show, by means of 
textual analysis, that this term does not have the same sense across these 
occurrences. The problem with this strategy is that the argument it provides could be 
countered by arguing that, although they occur in mathematical texts, some of these 
occurrences are not specifically mathematical. Thus, I prefer to look beyond this 
objection and to proceed in the second way. I shall present different senses in which 
it seems to me that one should admit that a mathematical statement could be true, 
and argue that when a statement is true according to one of these senses it is not true 
for the same sort of reason as when it—or any other statement—is true according to 
any other one of them. 
In doing this, my intention is not to argue against realism in mathematics. Far 
from it, I argue that if the opposition between realism and anti-realism in 
mathematics is genuine and crucial, and if one speaks of mathematical truth in the 
senses I shall consider here, then this opposition is not concerned with truth. This is 
the reason why I take these senses to be sober ones. My aim is simply to show that it 
is possible to speak of truth in mathematics without being engaged in doubtful and 
controversial ontology. Of course, I admit that one could also speak of truth in 
mathematics in other and not sober senses. It is even a matter of fact that a lot of 
philosophers and mathematicians have done and do this. I do not intend to make a 
stand against their attitude here. I simply advance the hypothesis that sober senses 
(the ones I shall consider or some other ones that could be added to my list) would 
suffice to give a satisfactory account of mathematical practice or activity (though I 
concede that this account might not meet the intentions and metaphysical 
convictions of some mathematicians).  
1 
Up to now, I have generically used the term “sense” in order to refer to a certain way 
to conceive truth in mathematics. To be more precise, I shall from now on speak of 
truth-conditions and of definitions and conceptions of truth. I shall speak of truth-
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condition and definition of truth for a certain statement in order to refer respectively 
to the condition that such a statement has to satisfy in order to be true, and to the 
statement that specifies such a condition. I shall speak instead of conception of truth 
for a certain class of statements in order to refer to a general condition imposed on 
the truth-conditions for the statements of this class. Thus, in order to present 
different senses in which one should admit that mathematical statements could be 
true, I shall advance different conceptions of truth for different classes of 
mathematical statements. 
Before doing this, let me present a general condition that, in my opinion, any 
definition of truth for a mathematical statement, should satisfy. 
This is Tarski’s condition. I require that any definition of the truth of a 
mathematical statement should be expressed by an instance of Tarski’s schema: “p” 
is true if and only if p. I shall not argue in favour of such a condition. I simply argue 
that, taken as such, an instance of Tarski’s schema is nothing but a sentence of a 
certain language, i. e. a well formed combination of terms (or formula) of this 
language. It is thus not sufficient to supply an instance of Tarski’s schema for a 
certain statement in order to get a definition of truth for this statement and thus fix a 
truth-condition for it. In order to do that, it is also necessary to interpret such a 
sentence, that is, to take it as being the expression of a certain statement. 
Suppose that a particular instance of Tarski’s schema is uttered in a certain 
language L’ in order to provide a truth-condition for a certain statement x of another 
language L. L’ should then serve as a meta-language with respect to L. Hence L’ 
would contain a name for x, to be used to form the first member of the bi-conditional 
constituting such an instance of Tarski’s schema. This name should not only denote 
x in L’, but also be, as such, functionally related to the second member of this bi-
conditional. And this second member should, in turn, be a sentence of L’ expressing 
a certain statement. It is just this latter statement that fixes a truth-condition of x. 
A definition of the truth of a statement x of a language L is thus a bi-conditional 
whose two members are two statements of a meta-language L’, the first saying that x 
has the property to be true, and the second being the value taken by a function 
ψ : N’ → S’ (in which N’ is the set of the names of L’ and S’ the set of the 
statements of L’) when its argument is the name of x in L’. Of course, not every 
name of L’ could be an argument for such a function. In order to be so, a name of L’ 
should be the name of a statement of L and result from a quotation. Tarski’s schema 
would then suggest the following: Take the statement x as it is uttered in L; 
transform it into its same name in L’ by adding quotation marks to the sentence of L 
which expresses it, and use this name to form a statement of L’ saying that x has the 
property of being true; disquote such a sentence in order to obtain another statement 
of L’; and form a bi-conditional whose two members are given by these two 
statements of L’. This means that Tarski’s schema would suggest to define a 
function τ : S → S’ (S being the set of the statements of L) by composing a function 
ν : S → N’, giving the name of x in 'L  when applied to x, with another function 
ψ : N’ → S’. It is just the value of this function τ that ultimately would provide a 
truth-condition for x. 
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Suppose now that the function ν is simply the quotation function: applied to a 
statement of L, it gives a name for this statement in L’ by simply adding quotation 
marks to the sentence which expresses this statement. Then the function ψ can not 
simply be the disquotation function, since when this function is composed with ν, it 
can only produce the identity function and not a function τ from S to S’. Thus, either 
ν is not simply the quotation function, or ψ is not simply the disquotation function. 
It follows that either there is more in Tarski’s schema that the simple allegation of 
the quotation and the disquotation functions (jointly with the instruction to form a 
suitable bi-conditional by using their values), or it is not sufficient to supply an 
instance of Tarski’s schema for a certain statement in order to get a definition of 
truth for this statement and thus fix a truth-condition for it. But, in Tarski’s schema, 
there is nothing more than that; hence, it is not sufficient to apply this schema to a 
certain statement in order to get a definition of truth for this statement and thus fix a 
truth-condition for it. 
A definition of truth of a certain statement x of a language L is rather a bi-
conditional statement of a meta-language L’, whose first member says of x that it has 
the property of being true, and the second one is the value taken by a function τ from 
S to S’ when it is applied to x, under the condition that this function results from the 
composition of the quotation function ν from S to N’ and a function ψ from N’ to S’ 
such that ψ (ν  (x)) is the statement of L’ expressed by the same sentence that 
expresses x in L. This bi-conditional statement has thus the form: ν (x) is true if and 
only if τ  (x), where ν  (x) is the name of x in L’ and τ  (x) = ψ  (ν  (x)). 
Of course, a definition of this sort can only be uttered in L’ if this language 
contains all the terms of L entering in x. This is an obvious necessary condition. But 
it is not sufficient, since to say that a statement of L’ is expressed by the same 
sentence that expresses it in L is not sufficient in order to identify this statement. The 
work of the function ψ is just to identify this statement.  
Thus, either it is admitted that at least some ones of the sentences of L’ are such 
that one of them may express different statements, or it is admitted that the 
statements of L’ are not given independently of the specification of the functions ψ 
and τ. I favour the second possibility. After all, it seems to me very natural to 
conceive the language L’ as being constructed on the basis of L just in order to utter 
truth-conditions for the statements of this latter language, rather than as an already 
given language fortuitously satisfying all the conditions that should be satisfied by a 
meta-language with respect to L where a definition of truth for a statement of L 
could be uttered. 
It follows that, in my opinion, in order to advance a conception of truth for a 
certain class X of mathematical statements of a certain language L, one should 
simply specify the nature of the function τ entering the truth-conditions of the 
statements belonging to X and allowing the determination of the statements of L’. 
This is what I shall do.  
Before to do that, let me consider some consequences of Tarski’s condition. 
Suppose that one has specified the nature of the function τ entering the truth-
conditions of the statements belonging to a certain class X of mathematical 
 SOME SOBER CONCEPTIONS OF MATHEMATICAL TRUTH 5 
statements, and has thus advanced a conception of truth for this class of 
mathematical statements. One can then advance a conception of falsehood in the 
same way, by assuming that a definition of the falsehood of a certain mathematical 
statement x belonging to a certain language L and a certain class X of mathematical 
statements is a bi-conditional statement of a language L’ working as a meta-
language with respect to L, namely the statement: ν (x) is false if and only if non 
τ (x), where non τ (x), is the negation of the statement τ (x) in 'L . It is then only a 
question of propositional logic to derive in L’ the following bi-conditional: ν (x) is 
not true if and only if ν (x) is false. But what about the truth or the falsehood of the 
negation of x in L? If such a negation belongs to X, the previous definitions give, by 
substitution: ν (non x) is true if and only if τ (non x) and ν (non x) is false if and 
only if non τ (non x). However, nothing enables us in general to derive from here the 
bi-conditionals: ν (non x) is true if and only if non τ (x), or ν (x) is false if and only 
if τ (non x). To do that, we would have to admit that τ (non x) is identical with non 
τ (x), and nothing enables us to admit that in general. Nevertheless, nothing prevents 
the function τ from satisfying such a further condition. If this is the case, it is then 
only a question of propositional logic to derive the bi-conditional ν (non x) is true if 
and only if ν (x) is false, and, if either the logic in L or the logic in L’ are classical, 
also the conditional ν (non x) is false if and only if ν (x) is true. It would follow that 
the truth of the negation of x is equivalent to the falsehood of x, and if either the 
logic in the language which x belongs to or the logic in the language in which this 
definition is stated are classical, it is also such that the truth of x is equivalent to the 
falsehood of the negation of x. This is a remarkable condition, and it seems to me 
that we are entitled to qualify a conception of truth that satisfies it as a 
correspondentist conception of truth. 
2 
The first conception of truth I shall advance is just a sober correspondentist 
conception. Thus it constitutes an example proving that a correspondentist 
conception of truth for a class of mathematical statements can be sober.  
2.1 
Take a sentence like the following one: “the primitive of 
2
2
2
45
aax
axx
+
+
 is 
x
2
a
ax + a
2
+ C .” It seems to me that one possible way of understanding the 
statement expressed by such a sentence, say s, is to take it as referring to the 
symbolic expressions that enter it. If so, the statement s tells us that if one applies 
the derivative algorithm to the expression 
x
2
a
ax + a
2
+ C , one obtains the 
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expression 
2
2
2
45
aax
axx
+
+
. It is thus a statement describing a relation between two 
symbolic expressions, that is, two equivalence-classes of empirical objects such as 
concrete signs. One is then entitled, I think, to take s as true, just because the 
application of the derivative algorithm to the expression 
x
2
a
ax + a
2
+ C  gives 
the expression 
2
2
2
45
aax
axx
+
+
. This is simply a way to understand the term “primitive.” 
Let us suppose that s belongs to a language L. This means that L is the language in 
which the sentence “the primitive of 
2
2
2
45
aax
axx
+
+
 is 
x
2
a
ax + a
2
+ C ” expresses 
s. The function τ entering a possible truth-condition of s should thus simply 
associate s to a statement τ (x) of a suitable meta-language 'L  expressed in such a 
language by the same sentence “the primitive of 
2
2
2
45
aax
axx
+
+
 is 
x
2
a
ax + a
2
+ C ” and asserting here that the application of the derivative 
algorithm to the expression 
x
2
a
ax + a
2
+ C  gives the expression 
2
2
2
45
aax
axx
+
+
. 
In other terms, this function should associate s to a statement of 'L  telling us the 
same as that which the statement s tells us in L. 
It is easy to generalise this example. Let us consider a class X of mathematical 
statements of a language L asserting that a certain rule of formal transformation 
applied to a certain expression produces or does not produce another given 
expression. A possible conception of truth for such a class of statements simply 
requires that the function τ defined over this class associates any statement x of X to 
a statement of L’ telling us the same as that which the statement x tells us in L; that 
is, that the rule of formal transformation that x refers to, when applied to the first 
expression that x refers to, produces the second expression that x refers to. I suggest 
that a lot of mathematical statements can be conceived as asserting that a certain rule 
of formal transformation applied to a certain expression produces or does not 
produce another given expression, and that one is thus entitled to apply to them such 
a correspondentist conception of truth.  
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2.2 
To pass to other conceptions of truth, let us consider the same sentence as before: 
“the primitive of 
2
2
2
45
aax
axx
+
+
 is 
x
2
a
ax + a
2
+ C .” One could also understand 
the statement expressed by such a sentence, say s*, by referring the term “primitive” 
not to the derivative algorithm, but to the general definition of derivative. If so, s* 
tells to us that the limit of 
x + h( )
2
a
a x + h( ) + a2 + C !
x
2
a
ax + a2 ! C
h
 
when h tends toward 0 is equal to 
2
2
2
45
aax
axx
+
+
. If the derivative algorithm is taken as 
being justified by having shown that it satisfies the general definition of derivative, 
the difference between the statement s* and the statement s considered in the 
previous example is far from being essential from a mathematical point of view. 
This is not my point, however. What is important for me is that the equivalence of 
these two statements has to be set up by means of a proof, which is not, as such, part 
of these two statements. It seems to me that this allows us to consider these two 
statements as distinct from each other.  
One could certainly hold that to say that the limit of 
x + h( )
2
a
a x + h( ) + a2 + C !
x
2
a
ax + a2 ! C
h
 when h tends toward 0 is 
equal to 
2
2
2
45
aax
axx
+
+
is nothing but asserting that the first expression can be 
transformed into the second one by applying certain rules of transformation in a 
suitable way. If so, the situation does not change with respect to the case considered 
in Section 2.1: Though the truth of the statement s and the truth of the statement s* 
do not depend on the same reason, the reasons they depend on are of the same sort; 
and the truth-conditions of these statements satisfy the same conception of truth, 
since a certain sequence of rules of transformation is itself a rule of transformation. 
But one could also argue that this is not so: that when speaking of limit, we are 
implicitly referring to functions, whereas when operating according to certain rules 
of transformation, we are working with symbolic expressions, eventually with the 
symbolic expressions expressing these functions. When we are considering 
particular functions like the previous ones, the difference between a function and the 
expression that expresses it could appear to be minor. But it is not certainly so in 
general, and it is not so in particular, when we are referring to a class of functions 
respecting certain general conditions, like continuous functions or limited functions. 
Thus, it should be clear that a statement referring to these functions can not be 
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understood as asserting that a certain rule of formal transformation applied to a 
certain expression produces or does not produce another given expression.  
Hence, if one wanted to understand the statement s*, or any other statement 
about functions, as a description of some objects and/or their relations, one should 
admit that these objects do not simply consist of equivalence-classes of empirical 
objects. This is also the case for statements about numbers, sets, algebraic structures, 
and a lot of other mathematical entities that cannot be understood as equivalence-
classes of empirical objects. One could think that there is no way to admit that these 
statements can be true or false unless their truth-conditions depend on a function τ 
that is supposed to associate any one of these statements to a statement of a suitable 
meta-language telling us that the objects it refers to have the properties or relations it 
assigns to them. A similar conception of truth is hardly a sober one. Far from 
arguing here that a similar conception of truth is not tenable, I limit myself to 
ignoring it and advancing three sober alternative options. 
2.2.1 
The first two options consist in requiring that the function τ associates any statement 
x of the considered class of statements of a language L to a statement of a suitable 
meta-language 'L , telling us respectively that the statement x has been proved or is 
provable within the theory to which it belongs. 
Of course, to say that x has been proved in a certain mathematical theory is not the 
same thing as saying that it is provable in such a theory, whatever our notion of 
proof. I shall not enter into this distinction here. I simply observe that in the first 
case, τ (non x) is certainly not identical with non τ (x), whereas in the second case, 
the identity of τ (non x) and non τ (x) depends on the nature of the mathematical 
theory to which x belongs. Thus, the conception of truth depending on the first 
option is never correspondentist, whereas the conception of truth depending on the 
second is not so in general.  
However, if the first option were accepted, then it would be very unsatisfactory 
to define the falsehood of x by the bi-conditional ν (x) is false if and only if non 
τ (x). The bi-conditional ν (x) is false if and only if τ (non x) would be preferable. 
Hence, it would be only a question of propositional logic to derive in L’: ν (non x) is 
true if and only if ν (x) is false. By substitution, one also would have: ν (non x) is 
false if and only if τ (non non x). Thus, if the logic in L were classical, it would also 
be only a question of propositional logic to derive in L’: ν (non x) is false if and only 
if τ (x) and thus ν (x) is true if and only if ν (non x) is false. But it would not be 
possible to derive: ν (x) is not true if and only if ν (x) is false. Thus a statement x 
could be not true, without being false. 
One could object to these conceptions of truth by drawing on a classic argument 
first presented by Tarski. Using godelisation, one can associate injectively each 
sentence of a formal theory, that is, a mathematical one, to a natural number, and 
thus each set of sentences of a formal theory to a set of natural numbers. Supposing 
that any sentence of a formal theory is associated bijectively which a statement that 
is expresses, and that to prove a statement in such a theory is nothing but to derive in 
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it the sentence that expresses it, one could then wonder whether the set of numbers 
associated to provable statements and the set of numbers associated to true 
statements are identical. Now, because of the nature of a formal theory, the first of 
these sets can be characterized in terms of simple arithmetical operations and 
relations. One could then translate the definition of provability into the language of 
the theory, that is the object-language. If a similar translation were also possible for 
the definition of truth, this language would be semantically universal and then it 
would be possible to use it to formulate the antinomy of the liar. Thus, either the 
antinomy of the liar can be formulated in the language of a formal theory, or 
provability within this theory and truth of its statements are not extensionally 
equivalent properties.  
Though admitting that a mathematical theory could take the form of a formal 
theory and that a proof of a statement in such a theory reduces to a formal deduction 
of a sentence, this argument does not seem to me to be a conclusive reason to reject 
the previous conceptions of truth for the statements of such a theory. After all, these 
are sober conceptions, and they are simply supposed to correspond to two different 
senses in which mathematicians speak or have spoken of truth. Thus, if Tarski’s 
argument is correct, it simply discloses that these senses make it possible to 
formulate the antinomy of the liar within a mathematical formal theory. Notice, 
moreover, that this is not the same as asserting that this theory is not consistent, 
since the theory itself is completely independent of the nature of the meta-language 
used to assign to its statements the property of being true.  
2.2.2 
The comparison between the statements s and s* expressed by the same sentence in a 
language L suggests the possibility of defining the truth of one of these statements, 
say s, by means of a statement of a meta-language L’, telling us in this latter 
language the same as that which the other statement, say s, tells us in L. In such a 
way, one could also assign a sober sense to the distinction between truth and proof 
or provability. One could admit that in order to prove that the primitive of 
2
2
2
45
aax
axx
+
+
is 
x
2
a
ax + a
2
+ C , one should show that the limit of 
x + h( )
2
a
a x + h( ) + a2 + C !
x
2
a
ax + a2 ! C
h
when h tends toward 0 is 
equal to 
2
2
2
45
aax
axx
+
+
, though maintaining that the statement s* is true because the 
application of the derivative algorithm to the second of these expressions simply 
produces the first. When understood in this way, the distinction between truth and 
proof or provability reduces to a methodological one and just concerns the internal 
organisation of a certain mathematical theory.  
A similar view can be applied to universal statements.  
10 M. PANZA 
Let us take the example of the last theorem of Fermat. This tells us that if n is a 
natural number greater than 2, then there is no trio of strictly positive natural 
numbers x, y, and z such that xn + yn = zn. The simpler way to understand this 
theorem is to take it as assuring us that no substitution of the letters “x,” “y,” “z” and 
“n” in the sentence “xn + yn = zn” with symbols of natural numbers satisfying the 
previous conditions transforms this sentence into numerical identity. However, there 
is no way to prove it by considering such substitutions. To do that, it should be 
rather showed that the fact that x, y, z, and n are four natural numbers satisfying 
these conditions is a sufficient condition for the sum xn + yn to be different from zn. 
The same point can be made in general. Any universal theorem can be 
understood in at least two ways: a distributive or extensional way and a compact or 
intensional way. Extensionally, it asserts that every single element of a certain 
domain has a certain property; intensionally, it asserts that it is sufficient to belong 
to such a domain to have this property. If the domain is an infinite one, there is no 
other way to prove this theorem than by proving the latter. However, one should 
maintain that this theorem is true because of the former. 
In general, one could identify a theorem (of a certain sort) with an equivalence-
class of statements composed of two statements, and assume that the proof of this 
theorem is concerned with one of these statements, while its truth is concerned with 
the other.  
It would then be sufficient to treat an equivalence-class of statements as a 
statement whose utterance is nothing but the utterance of one of its members in 
order to be able to present a conception of truth that fits with such a view. Let us 
consider a class X of mathematical statements of a language L and two relations of 
equivalence defined over X, say R’ and R’’, such that R’ divides X into several 
equivalence-classes, each of which is composed of two distinct statements, and R’’ 
divides X in two equivalence-classes respectively composed of one and only one of 
the two statements making up each one of the classes of equivalence in which X is 
shared by R’. Let Xp and Xt be the two classes in which X is divided by R’’. A 
conception of truth for X could require that the function τ defined over this class 
associates any statement x of X to a statement of a suitable meta-language L’ telling 
us the same as the statement of L equivalent to x according to R’ and belonging to 
the class Xt. At the same time, one could suppose that in order to prove any 
statement x of X, one should produce an argument showing that the things are as it is 
said by the statement of L being equivalent to x according to R’ and belonging to the 
class Xt. 
In the case of the last theorem of Fermat, the role of the statement x is taken by 
any one of the two statements telling us respectively that: no substitution of the 
letters “x,” “y,” “z,” and “n” in the sentence “xn + yn = zn” with symbols of naturals 
numbers satisfying the given conditions transforms this sentence into a numerical 
identity; and that the fact that x, y, z, and n are four natural numbers satisfying these 
condition is a sufficient condition for the sum xn + yn to be different from zn. The 
role of the statement of L equivalent to x according to R’ and belonging to the class 
t
X  is taken by the first of these two statements, and the role of the statement of L 
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equivalent to x according to R’ and belonging to the class Xp is taken by the second 
one.  
If X is a class of universal statements, the relations R’ and R’’ can be defined on 
this class in such a way that R’ associates one to each other two statements telling us 
respectively that every single element of a certain domain has a certain property, and 
that it is sufficient to belong to such a domain to have this property, while Xt and Xp 
coincide respectively with the class of the elements of X having an extensional form 
and the class of the elements of X having an intensional form. It is then possible to 
generalise to any statement of X the previous way to fix the truth-condition of the 
last theorem of Fermat. However,, this is nothing but a particular case of the 
conception of truth I am presenting here, since nothing prevents us from defining the 
relations R’ and R’’ on a certain class of mathematical statements, either universal or 
not, in a different way. The example of the statements s et s* suggests a way to do it 
in a certain case. Other strategies could be followed in other cases. 
I shall not enter into a discussion of these strategies. I limit myself to observing 
that such a conception is a correspondentist one, and that it is, as such, sober. Of 
course, one could associate it with an understanding of distributive statements that 
depends on some strong ontological or epistemological condition and thus transform 
it into a non sober conception. Nevertheless, this is not necessary. In order to refer to 
such a conception saying that a certain mathematical statement x is true and 
distinguishing between its truth and its proof or provability, it is sufficient to have at 
one’s disposal a procedure able to decide, in any specific case covered by this 
statement, whether the things are or are not as claimed by the statement of L 
equivalent to x according to R’ and belonging to the class Xt. In the case of the last 
theorem of Fermat, it is, for example, sufficient to have at one’s disposal a 
procedure able to decide, for every set of four natural numbers <x, y, z, n> satisfying 
the given conditions, whether xn + yn = zn or not. And there is no doubt that all who 
are acquainted with elementary arithmetic and have a sufficient computational 
capacity have such a procedure at their disposal. Of course, if the specific cases one 
should consider in order to exhaust the domain covered by the statement under 
examination are infinite in number, one would never know in this way whether this 
statement is true or not. But, far from being an unsatisfactory consequence of the 
present conception of truth, such a circumstance shows how close this conception is 
to any acceptable conception of truth for empirical universal statements.  
2.3 
The last conception of truth I consider here is a very classic and traditional one. I 
shall limit myself to observe that, under suitable conditions, this conception can be 
understood as being sober, and to present it in an uncustomary frame.  
Let us take the example of the Bolzano-Waierstrass theorem: If f (x) is a 
continuous function from R to R defined both in a and b, K is a real value, and 
f (a) < K < f (b), then there is a real value c such that f (c) = K.  
In classical analysis, this theorem is proved by reduction to absurd, by showing 
that its negation contradicts the axiom of the superior upper bound. This is a non-
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constructive proof that (from a classical point of view) only warrants that c exists 
without exhibiting it. Its legitimacy has been thus the object of several discussions. I 
do not want to return to such an issue here. I simply observe that the principal reason 
for a mathematician to be not disposed to renounce to this theorem is not a logical 
one, being rather concerned with the expressive power of mathematics.  
A theory of real continuous function in which it is not possible to prove the 
Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem could hardly pretend to be useful for explaining a 
large class of real phenomena. Suppose that John and Mary are in Paris and that 
John walks from the Arc de Triomphe to the Place de la Concorde along the left side 
of the Champs Élysées, while Mary is somewhere on this same side of the Champs 
Élysées, drinking a glass of champagne. They will probably meet there. A theory or 
real continuous function in which it is not possible to prove the Bolzano-Waierstrass 
theorem cannot be used to explain this trivial phenomenon. To conclude that such a 
theory would thus be unsatisfactory is the same as admitting that a mathematical 
theory should have an expressive power and that this power is part of its 
mathematical legitimacy.  
Once this has been admitted, it is very natural to speak of the truth of certain 
mathematical statements by referring to their expressive power rather than to their 
intra-theoric content. Let us suppose that X is a class of statements of this sort 
belonging to a certain theory T and a certain language L. For advancing a conception 
of truth which justifies thus way of speaking, it is sufficient to define a function ϕ 
that associates any statement x of X with another statement ϕ (x) referring to objects 
that are not part of the domain of T and require that the function τ defined over X 
associates any statement x of X to a statement of a suitable meta-language 'L  telling 
us the same as the statement ϕ (x). 
This is what one does when defining the truth of a mathematical statement with 
respect to a certain model of the theory this statement belongs to. A classic example 
is the definition of the truth for the statements of Peano’s arithmetic with respect to 
one of its set-theoretical models. Notice, however, that the possibility to define the 
truth of a mathematical statement in this way does not depend on the possibility to 
define a model for the whole theory this statements belongs to according to the 
constraints of the logical theory of models. The statement expressing the Bolzano-
Weierstrass theorem could, for example, be associated by ϕ to a statement 
concerning suitable curves traced on a Cartesian plane, without need for these 
curves to belong to a model (in the sense of the logical theory of models) for the 
whole theory of real functions.  
It seems to me that in order to understand this conception of truth for a certain 
class X of mathematical statements as being sober, it is not necessary to suppose that 
the statements associated to the statements of X by the function ϕ are not 
mathematical in turn, or do not refer to objects that are involved as such, or could be 
involved with a controversial ontology. What it is needed is simply that these latter 
statements or any one of their particular instances (if they are universal statements of 
a distributive form) are somehow decidable, that is, that there is an effective 
procedure to decide whether these statements or any one of their particular instances 
can be asserted or not. 
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This last remark, together with the example given by the conceptions of truth 
presented above, should make clearer what I mean by “sober”. Taking the Tarski’s 
condition for granted, I maintain that a conception of truth for a class X of 
mathematical statements of a language L is sober if and only if there is no need to 
appeal to a controversial ontology in order to describe the conditions under which 
the statement τ (x) of L’ is assertible. 
As there is neither a generally accepted criterion to decide what is a controversial 
ontology nor a general accepted definition of assertibility, and my formulation of 
Tarski’s condition does not involve any strict constraint on the nature of the 
statement τ (x), it would be easy to object that my characterization of the general 
notion of a sober conception of truth for a class of mathematical statements is so 
large that one could arbitrarily suggest many other sober conceptions of truth. I 
accept the point, but I do not think that this is an argument against my views.  
I have two reasons for maintaining this.  
First, it seems to me that however large it could be, my characterisation of the 
general notion of sober conception of truth for a class of mathematical statements 
sets up a general form that a sober conception of truth should satisfy. I claim this 
very useful because I think that the only proper way to speak of truth in general is to 
fix a form that a certain predicate should satisfy in order to be taken in certain 
contexts as the predicate “to be true.” This is the same as arguing that the term 
“true” should be taken in general—that is, independently of any specific and 
contextual definitional clause—as referring to an equivalence-class of predicates 
rather than to a single and well-defined predicate.  
My second reason is also a justification of this attitude: I argue that as far as 
philosophy may lead us, it cannot do more than provide us with some general 
categories to be used to study real phenomena. Philosophy of mathematics should 
provide us with some general categories that can be used to study mathematics as a 
given reality. Though philosophy certainly has a history, a method, and a 
disciplinary content to which it refers, these categories should not be shaped 
abstractly. What ultimately decides whether they are the good ones or not is neither 
philosophy nor logic. It is rather the reality to which they should be applied. 
